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Assn. of Justice Counsel:  
The Section 7 Liberty Interest in  
the Context of Employment 
Hamish Stewart 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Assn. of Justice Counsel v. Canada (Attorney General)1 is a labour 
arbitration case. An employer issued a directive requiring employees to be 
available for overtime work. The union argued that the directive was not a 
proper exercise of a management rights clause in a collective agreement. But 
the employer was the government, and the collective agreement also 
contained a clause forbidding the employer to violate employees’ Charter 
rights.2 And so the union also argued that the directive violated the 
employees’ rights under section 7 of the Charter. An adjudicator agreed with 
the union on both grounds. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
adjudicator’s decision as to management rights was reasonable, but rejected 
the union’s constitutional argument on the ground that the directive did not 
affect the employees’ section 7 right to liberty. It was therefore unnecessary 
to consider whether it was consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice. In my view, this constitutional holding was probably wrong. 
Requiring someone to be somewhere at a particular time does affect the 
liberty interest, both in itself and, if sufficiently demanding of a person’s 
time, through its impact on fundamental personal choices. The Court’s 
reluctance to recognize these points may unnecessarily impede the continued 
development of the section 7 liberty interest. Moreover, the constitutional 
                                                                                                                       
   Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am very grateful to Sonia Lawrence and Benjamin 
Berger for the invitation to speak at the 2018 Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference, to Brian Langille 
for a helpful conversation, to Sonia Lawrence and two anonymous readers for comments on a draft, and to 
James Schneider for a very useful and engaging research memorandum. 
1  [2017] S.C.J. No. 55, 2017 SCC 55 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Assn. of Justice Counsel”], varg 
[2016] F.C.J. No. 204, 2016 FCA 92 (F.C.A.), which allowed the employer’s application for judicial 
review of the adjudicator’s decision, 2015 PSLREB 31 [hereinafter “Decision”]. 
2  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
296 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
holding is inconsistent with the Court’s determination that the adjudicator’s 
decision was reasonable. On the facts of Assn. of Justice Counsel, if 
section 7 of the Charter applied at all, the constitutional issue and the issue 
of interpreting the collective agreement were essentially the same and should 
have been resolved the same way. 
II. OVERVIEW 
Lawyers working in the Quebec office of the Immigration Law 
Directorate of the federal Department of Justice were, from time to time, 
required to work outside regular hours to deal with urgent matters. Until 
2010, the office used a system whereby lawyers would volunteer to be on 
standby and would be compensated with paid time off, whether or not 
any matters actually arose requiring their attention. In March 2010, the 
Director of the Quebec office changed the standby system so that lawyers 
on standby would be paid only if their services were actually required. 
After that, there were no more volunteers. So, in April 2010, the Director 
issued a directive requiring all lawyers in the office to be available for 
standby duty, on a rotational basis. The result was that each lawyer was 
required to be on standby one to three weeks per year.3 The Court 
described standby duty as follows: 
The standby period is from 5:00-9:00 p.m. on weekdays and from 
9:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m. on weekends. While on standby, the lawyers need to 
be ready to prepare and argue possible stay applications on short notice. 
They must carry an employer-issued pager and cell phone and be able 
to reach their office within approximately one hour if called.4 
The lawyers’ union grieved the directive. The collective agreement did 
not speak explicitly to the issue of standby duty, but it did contain 
standard clauses preserving management rights and requiring the 
employer to administer the agreement reasonably. The adjudicator held 
that the directive was not a reasonable exercise of the employer’s 
management rights. The Federal Court of Appeal held that the 
adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Canada, 
by a 7-2 majority, reversed the Court of Appeal on this point and held 
that the adjudicator’s decision was reasonable. 
                                                                                                                       
 
3  This summary is based on Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at paras. 4-8 and the 
Decision, supra, note 1, at para. 7. 
4  Assn. of Justice Counsel, id., at para. 7. 
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But there was an additional element to the grievance. The collective 
agreement provided that nothing in it “shall be construed as an 
abridgment or restriction of any lawyer’s constitutional rights …”. The 
union argued that the directive also violated that provision, specifically 
that it violated section 7 of the Charter. To demonstrate a violation of 
section 7, a Charter applicant has to show that the government action in 
question affects their “life, liberty or security of the person” and that the 
effect on life, liberty or security is not “in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice.”5 As noted, the directive required the lawyers to 
be on call at certain times, and a lawyer on call was required to “be able 
to reach their office within approximately an hour if called.”6 The 
adjudicator held that the section 7 liberty interest included “the right to 
enjoy a private life outside the workplace and outside normal work 
hours”.7 On that basis, he concluded that the directive engaged section 7. 
The adjudicator further held that the directive did not comply with the 
principles of fundamental justice because its deleterious effect on the 
liberty interest was “completely disproportionate to its objective”, in that 
there were other ways that the employer could have structured the on-call 
system that would have affected the liberty interest less.8 
The Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada both 
held that the directive did not even engage section 7 (and that it was 
therefore unnecessary to consider whether it complied with the principles 
of fundamental justice). The Supreme Court of Canada first hinted that 
section 7 might not apply at all, but went on to say that even if section 7 
did apply, it was not engaged. The Court has recognized that the 
section 7 liberty interest protects certain fundamental personal 
decisions;9 but it has not extended that idea to cover every decision that 
any individual happens to consider important. The Court understood the 
union’s claim as an attempt to do just that, and rejected it on the ground 
                                                                                                                       
 
5  On s. 7 generally, see Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) 
[hereinafter “Stewart, Fundamental Justice”].  
6  Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 7. 
7  Decision, supra, note 1, at para. 60.  
8  Decision, id., at para. 65. 
9  Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 49, citing R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. 
No. 79, 2003 SCC 74 (S.C.C.), where the interest in question was not recognized; and Godbout v. 
Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.), where the interest was recognized, 
though not by a clear majority of the Court. Strangely, the Court did not mention Carter v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5 (S.C.C.), where the Court unanimously recognized a 
decision of fundamental personal importance as engaging the s. 7 liberty interest. 
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that the directive did not affect the employees’ control over fundamental 
personal choices: 
… not all activities that an individual happens to define as central to his 
or her lifestyle are protected by s. 7. … By analogy, the ability of the 
lawyers — for two to three weeks per year — to attend opera or piano 
lessons, or to train for a triathlon without having to keep a pager nearby 
are not protected by s. 7. 
… the directive requires them, as a condition of employment, to be 
potentially less available to their family for, at most, two to three weeks 
a year. This does not fall within the scope of s. 7.10 
The Court did not reach the question whether the directive was consistent 
with the principles of fundamental justice. 
III. ASSESSMENT 
Thus, the Court upheld the adjudicator’s holding that the directive 
was not a reasonable exercise of management rights, but, disagreeing 
with the adjudicator, held that the directive did not even engage, much 
less violate,  the lawyers’ section 7 rights.11 There are two difficulties 
with these holdings. First, the holding that the directive did not engage 
section 7 is troubling. Second, the two holdings are inconsistent with 
each other. In the particular context of this case, it is hard to see how the 
employer’s exercise of its management rights could be unreasonable if 
section 7 was not engaged or, conversely, how that exercise of 
management rights could be reasonable if section 7 was engaged. 
1. The Section 7 Liberty Interest 
As noted above, the Court expressed some doubt as to whether 
section 7 applied at all in this context, commenting that “[t]he extent to 
which s. 7 of the Charter applies outside the context of the 
administration of justice has yet to be settled in this Court …”.12 This 
                                                                                                                       
 
10  Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at paras. 50-51. 
11  The adjudicator’s interpretation of the collective agreement is reviewed on the standard of 
reasonableness. The court does not discuss the standard of review applicable to the adjudicator’s 
constitutional reasoning, but appears to review it for correctness. In light of the subsequent decision in Law 
Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.), the 
appropriate standard would appear to be reasonableness. 
12  Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 49. 
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hesitancy is odd. Section 7 applies whenever legislation or other state 
action affects life, liberty or security of the person, regardless of the 
extent to which the state action in question involves “the administration 
of justice”.13 The most significant cases of recent years illustrate the 
point. In Bedford, the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated certain 
provisions of the Criminal Code concerning sex work;14 in Carter, the 
Court invalidated the provision of the Code prohibiting assisted suicide. 
In both cases, the Charter applicants argued that the provisions in 
question were unconstitutional not because their rights were violated 
when they were alleged to have violated these provisions, but because 
their rights were violated when they complied with them. And so the 
constitutional arguments in these cases focused not on issues 
characteristic of the administration of justice (jurisdiction,15 procedural 
fairness,16 mens rea requirements,17 and so forth) but on the effect of the 
provisions on the lives of people who were trying to comply with the law 
while carrying on a lawful economic activity (Bedford) or struggling 
with a debilitating disease (Carter). Thus, the connection between the 
constitutional arguments in these cases and the administration of justice 
was tenuous at best. 
But the Court did not base its decision on the question of whether 
section 7 applied; instead, the Court assumed that it did, but held that it was 
not engaged because the directive requiring each employee to be available 
outside working hours one to three weeks in the year did not affect any 
decision of fundamental personal importance. This reasoning misses the 
point of the union’s argument and of the adjudicator’s decision. The claim 
was not that the directive affected any personal choice in particular; it was 
that it affected private life in general, and therefore all the choices — 
regardless of where they fell on the spectrum between importance and 
triviality — that an employee might make. Having free time is essential to 
one’s ability to develop and practice those activities one thinks of as 
important, whatever they may be; and so, a law that interfered with one’s 
time to the extent of substantially impeding one’s opportunities to develop 
one’s interests (whatever they might be) would surely be subject to section 7 
                                                                                                                       
 
13  See Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 5, Chapter 2, and among the cases, see 
particularly Carter.  
14  Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72 (S.C.C.). 
15  For example, R. v. Moriarity, [2015] S.C.J. No. 55, 2015 SCC 55 (S.C.C.). 
16  For example, R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.). 
17  For example, R. v. Morrison, [2017] O.J. No. 3600, 2017 ONCA 582 (Ont. C.A.), appeal heard 
and reserved May 24, 2018, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 290 (S.C.C.). 
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scrutiny. A law that affected family bonds has already been recognized as 
engaging section 7,18 and more generally decisions about private life — 
whom to marry or partner with, whether to have children and how to raise 
them, how to develop and maintain the affective bonds that are necessary 
elements of personal life — are obvious candidates for protection under this 
branch of the liberty interest. State action that significantly restricts the time 
available for the development of one’s personal interests and interpersonal 
bonds should be recognized as engaging the section 7 liberty interest, not 
because it affects any personal choice in particular, but because it affects the 
possibility of making these choices at all. Even if the section 7 liberty 
interest does not protect the decision to engage in any particular activity, it 
surely does protect the exercise of the capacity to engage in activities in 
general; if not, legislation or other state action could indirectly restrict those 
fundamental life choices that have already been recognized as directly 
engaging the liberty interest by, for example, requiring everyone to be 
available to serve the state’s purposes every evening and weekend.  
If this line of argument is correct, the Court’s holding that section 7 
was not engaged might nevertheless be supported on a slightly different 
basis. The Court might be read as holding that the directive’s interference 
with the liberty interest was not sufficiently substantial to attract 
section 7 scrutiny. It is well established that trivial interferences with the 
liberty interest do not engage section 7.19 And although Karakatsanis J. 
does not put it that way, her repeated emphasis on the limited time 
commitment involved (availability after hours for “two to three weeks a 
year”20) suggests that that is what she had in mind. 
But, whatever one’s views about the impact of the directive on 
decisions of fundamental personal importance, there is a more 
straightforward and compelling argument that the directive engaged the 
lawyers’ liberty interest — an argument that was not made before  
the Supreme Court of Canada and appears not to have been raised in the 
proceedings below either. The directive limited the lawyers’ freedom of 
movement by requiring them to remain within a certain radius of their 
office for a certain period of time. Freedom of movement within Canada 
is a well-recognized aspect of the liberty interest. State action that 
prevents a person from moving about engages the liberty interest. 
Offence definitions, recognizances, court orders, and temporary security 
                                                                                                                       
 
18  New Brunswick (Minister of Heath and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, 
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.). 
19  See Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 5, Chapter 2(D)(5)(c). 
20  Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 51. 
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zones have all been recognized as engaging section 7 on this basis.21 
Moreover, state action that requires a person to appear at a certain place 
and time engage the liberty interest.22 And so a law or other government 
action that required all the residents of Quebec City, or even some proper 
subset of them, to remain in the city for a specific period of time would 
undoubtedly affect those residents’ liberty interests and would have to be 
consistent with the principles of fundamental justice in order to comply 
with section 7. The directive had just this effect on the lawyers’ freedom 
of movement. It therefore directly engaged the section 7 liberty interest. 
2. Section 7 in the Context of Government Employment  
The next step in a section 7 claim is to determine whether the effect 
on the liberty interest is consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice. The adjudicator found that the directive was overbroad because 
there were other ways for the employer to achieve its objective;23 and he 
also noted that “it is difficult to conclude otherwise in the absence of 
consent from [the employee], either in the form of a clear and precise 
availability clause or voluntarily in exchange for some form of return 
from the employer.”24 In other words, the directive would have been 
consistent with the principles of fundamental justice if it was a 
reasonable implementation of a clause that dealt specifically with 
overtime or had otherwise been bargained for. But that is precisely the 
same question, in constitutional guise, as the question whether the 
issuance of the directive was a reasonable exercise of the employer’s 
management rights. 
                                                                                                                       
 
21  R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, at 789 (S.C.C.) (offence 
definition); Ogden Entertainment Services v. Retail, Wholesale/Canada Canadian Service Sector Division 
of the United Steelworkers of America, Local 440, [1998] O.J. No. 1769, 159 D.L.R. (4th) 340 (Ont. Gen. 
Div.) (striking workers impeding traffic, though the Charter probably did not apply to them); R. v. Budreo, 
[2000] O.J. No. 72, 142 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at para. 23 (Ont. C.A.) (recognizance); Tremblay c. Quebec 
(Procureur général), [2001] J.Q. no 1504, at para. 47 (Que. C.S.) (temporary security perimeter during 
international meeting); Baril v. Obelnicki, [2007] M.J. No. 110, 2007 MBCA 40, at para. 69 (Man. C.A.) 
(court order, made under provincial legislation, restricting a person’s movements). See also Sahaluk v. 
Alberta (Transportation Safety Board), [2017] A.J. No. 499, 2017 ABCA 153 (Alta. C.A.), which is 
difficult to understand except on the assumption that limitations on the freedom to drive, as a particular 
form of the freedom to move about, can under some circumstances engage the s. 7 liberty interest. 
22  R. v. Tinker, [2017] O.J. No. 3435, 2017 ONCA 552, at para. 70 (Ont. C.A.), appeal heard and 
reserved April 15, 2018, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 371 (S.C.C.); Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal 
Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, 2004 SCC 42, at para. 67 (S.C.C.). 
23  Decision, supra, note 1, para. 66. 
24  Decision, id., para. 69. 
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In the context of an employment relationship, the legal basis for the 
employer’s direction of an employee’s movements is the employee’s 
agreement to be directed, through a contract of employment or a 
collective agreement. Direction in accordance with the contract of 
employment or collective agreement is lawful because it is authorized by 
agreement; direction that is not in accordance with the contract of 
employment or collective agreement violates the agreement. The Charter 
does not, of course, apply to private employers, and it is tempting to 
think that the Charter does not apply to the government either when it 
acts purely as an employer. Tempting, but unnecessary: for when the 
government is the employer, it is arguable that it is a principle of 
fundamental justice that the employer can affect the employee’s liberty 
interests only in accordance with the contract of employment. This 
principle meets the three criteria for recognition as a principle of 
fundamental justice: it is a legal principle; it is sufficiently precise; and it 
is deeply embedded in our legal order, specifically in the law of 
employment.25 
This principle of fundamental justice would in general overlap with 
the relevant employment law issues. For example, in St. Peter’s Health 
System v. CUPE, Local 778,26 the question was whether a policy of 
universal vaccination was authorized by the collective agreement. The 
arbitration board found that the policy was not authorized by the 
collective agreement. The board went on to say that compulsory 
vaccination would be forced medical treatment, which would engage the 
section 7 interest in security of the person,27 and then noted that such a 
policy could have been imposed by statute or bargained for.28 The 
unstated conclusion is that the policy would then not only have been 
authorized by the collective agreement but would have been consistent 
with the principles of fundamental justice and therefore with section 7. 
Similarly, on the facts of Assn. of Justice Counsel, it is very hard to 
see how the issuance of the directive could both be reasonable and 
violate the lawyers’ section 7 rights; or, on the other hand, how it could 
                                                                                                                       
 
25  On the criteria for identifying a principle of fundamental justice, see Stewart, Fundamental 
Justice, supra, note 5, Chapter 2B(3), and for a recent application of this test from the Supreme Court of 
Canada, see Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 7, 
2015 SCC 7 (S.C.C.). 
26  St. Peter’s Health System v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 778 (Flu Vaccination 
Grievance), [2002] O.L.A.A. No. 164, 106 L.A.C. (4th) 170 (Ont. Lab. Arb.) [hereinafter “St. Peter’s 
Health System”]. 
27  Compare Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 5, Chapter 2D(4)(a)). 
28  St. Peter’s Health System, supra, note 26, at 192. 
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be unreasonable without violating the lawyers’ section 7 rights. If the 
directive was authorized by the collective agreement, then the lawyers 
had consented to it via the collective bargaining process and, although it 
affected their liberty interest, that effect would accord with the principles 
of fundamental justice; but if the directive was not authorized by the 
collective Agreement, then that effect would violate the principle. To 
apply the relevant principle of fundamental justice is to answer the same 
question that the adjudicator decided.29 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s holding, in Assn. of Justice Counsel, that the directive at 
issue did not engage the section 7 liberty interest is unsatisfactory. It 
unnecessarily constrains the possible development of the branch of the 
liberty interest that is concerned with decisions of fundamental personal 
importance and it does not fit well with the Court’s holding that the 
adjudicator’s decision that the directive at issue was not authorized by 
the collective agreement was reasonable. If the adjudicator’s decision 
was reasonable, and if section 7 applied at all to the government as 
employer, then it would have been much more plausible to say that the 
directive did indeed engage the liberty interest and was not consistent 
with the principles of fundamental justice because it was not authorized 
by the collective agreement. 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
29  In her dissent, Côté J. describes the majority’s position as “contradictory”, on the ground that 
the erroneous s. 7 analysis was so important to the adjudicator’s decision that it tainted the rest of the 
decision; she is particularly puzzled as to how the majority could conclude that the s. 7 liberty interest was 
not engaged and yet find reasonable the adjudicator’s decision that the directive had a significant effect on 
the lawyers’ personal lives: Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 57. I am suggesting that on the 
facts of the case, the two questions are indistinguishable.  
 
